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General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemedti” is the face of Sudan’s
violent, political marketplace. Hemedti’s career is an object lesson in
political entrepreneurship by a specialist in violence; his conduct and
(as of now) impunity are the surest indicator that mercenarised politics
that have long de ned the Sudanese periphery, have been brought home
to the capital city. Hemedti’s Rapid Support Force (RSF), a paramilitary
led by Darfurian Arabs—and commonly decried as “Janjaweed”—are
today the dominant power in Khartoum.
During the peaceful democracy protests in Khartoum, demonstrators
chanted “we are all Darfur” as a rebuttal to regime propaganda, trying to
portray them as rebels from the far periphery. During the crackdown of
June 3, in which well over 100 protesters were killed, armed men
wearing RSF uniforms chanted “You used to chant the whole country is
Darfur. Now we brought Darfur to you, to Khartoum.”
“Hemedti” is the diminutive, endearing name for ‘little Mohamed’, which
Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo has ironically kept because of his fresh-
faced, youthful looks. For a moment, in the days after the April 11
overthrow of President Omar al Bashir, some of the young democracy
protesters camped in the streets around the Ministry of Defense
embraced him as the army’s new look.
Hemedti’s grandfather, Dagolo, was the head of a subclan of the
Mahariya Rizeigat Arab tribe that roamed across the pastures of Chad
and Darfur. Young men from the camel-herding Mahariya—landless and
marginalised in both countries—became a core element of the Arab
militia that fought in the vanguard of Khartoum’s counterinsurgency in
Darfur. Hemedti is from the farthest of Sudan’s far peripheries, an
outsider to the Khartoum political establishment.
Hemedti is a school dropout turned trader, without formal education or
military staff college—the title ‘General’ was awarded on account of his
pro ciency in  ghting and bargaining. He was a commander in the
Janjaweed brigade in Southern Darfur at the height of the 2003-05 war,
proving his mettle on the battle eld.
In 2007-08—the year of a widespread but inchoate rebellion by many of
the Janjaweed against their patrons, Hemedti was a prominent
mutineer. He led his forces into the bush, promising to  ght Khartoum
“until Judgment Day,” shot down an army helicopter, negotiated for an
alliance with the Darfurian rebels, and threatened to storm the city of
Nyala. Hemedti then cut a deal with the government, settling for a price
that included payment of his troops’ unpaid salaries, compensation to
the wounded and to the families of those killed, promotion to general,
and a handsome cash payment. A television documentary captures his
parallel negotiations with the Darfur rebels and his own government, his
charm and concern for his troops—and the fact that he enlisted Arabs
and non-Arabs alike in his ranks.
After returning to the Khartoum payroll, Hemedti proved his loyalty.
Pres. al-Bashir became fond of him, sometimes appearing to treat him
like the son he had never had. Al-Bashir reportedly called him
“Hamayti”—my protector.
Hemedti has ably used his commercial acumen, military prowess—and
the fact that the Sudanese establishment consistently underestimates
him—to build his militia into a force more powerful than the waning
Sudanese state.
On returning to the government fold, Hemedti’s troops constituted a
brigade of the “Border Guards” headed by Musa Hilal, the leader of the
Janjaweed. But he soon became a rival to his commander, and al-Bashir
constituted his forces as a separate force in 2013, initially to  ght the
rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in the Nuba
Mountains. The new Rapid Support Forces (RSF) came off second best.
But, with a  eet of new pickup trucks with heavy machine guns, the RSF
became a force to be reckoned with,  ghting a key battle against
Darfurian rebels in April 2015.
Following the March 2015 Saudi-Emirati military intervention in Yemen,
the director of al-Bashir’s o ce, Taha Hussein, cut a deal with Riyadh to
deploy Sudanese troops in Yemen. One of the commanders of the
operation as Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (current chair of the TMC).
But most of the  ghters were Hemedti’s RSF. This brought hard cash
direct into Hemedti’s pocket.
And in November 2017, when his arch-rival Hilal rebelled and was
captured, Hemedti’s forces took control of the artisanal gold mines in
Jebel Amer in Darfur—Sudan’s single largest source of export revenues.
Suddenly, Hemedti had his hands on the country’s two most lucrative
sources of hard currency.
Hemedti is adopting a model of state mercenarism familiar to those
who follow the politics of the Sahara. President Idriss Déby of Chad
rents out his special forces for counter-insurgencies on the French or
U.S. payroll in much the same manner. Hemedti has recently hired the
services of the Canadian lobbying  rm Dickens & Madson, which has
previous contracts with Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and
Libyan militia commander Khalifa Haftar, with the explicit aim, among
other things, of obtaining U.S. recognition and Russian funding. Expect
to see RSF troops deployed to Libya any day soon.
Meanwhile, with the routine deployment of paramilitaries to do the
actual  ghting in Sudan’s wars at home and abroad, the Sudanese army
has become akin to a vanity project: the proud owner of extravagant
real estate in Khartoum, with impressive tanks, artillery and aircraft, but
few battle-hardened infantry units. Other forces have stepped into this
security arena, including the operational units of the National
Intelligence and Security Services, and paramilitaries such as special
police units—and the RSF. When the democracy demonstrators
surrounded the Ministry of Defense on April 6, demanding that al-Bashir
must go, Hemedti was one of the security cabal whom al-Bashir
convened to decide how best to break this unarmed siege. Hemedti was
caught on video arguing for the use of force, though he later claimed it
was his brother speaking, not him. But on the morning of April 11, he
joined the army generals in deposing al-Bashir, rather than massacring
the protesters. For that he won a moment of celebrity.
Unnoticed by the eyes of the media, which are focused on Khartoum,
the RSF has been taking over the camps of the UN-African Union
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as that peacekeeping operation scales
down. Hemedti is positioning himself as the de facto paramilitary ruler
of Darfur. (That takeover was ordered to be halted after UN protests.)
Since revolution day, unlike the army generals who have been cautious,
even timid, and the leaders of the democracy protests, who have been
painstakingly consultative, Hemedti has acted boldly and decisively. He
saw that state power was lying in the streets of Khartoum to be seized
by whoever had the audacity to take it. Hemedti took it: he realised that
after decades of eviscerating political institutions, power in the capital
functioned no differently to in lawless Darfur.
As negotiations between the generals and the democracy protesters
dragged on, Hemedti repeatedly threatened to clear the streets by force
—and several times, his soldiers opened  re, killing or wounding one or
two.
Then, after al-Burhan and Hemedti visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Egypt, the TMC appears to have decided that it could impose military
rule without facing anything more than empty protests from the
international community. On June 3, Hemedti’s RSF brought his
Janjaweed methods to Khartoum. His forces rampaged through the city,
beginning with the camps of the protesters, burning the tents, often with
people inside. More than 100 were killed. Many were raped. Many were
chased through the streets, hunted down in their neighborhoods. They
rampaged through the university campus. The RSF  ghters terrorised
Khartoum.
Hemedti denies this, and avers that an independent investigation will
exonerate him. And indeed, most close observers think that it is
possible that he intended a limited attack, and that elements from the
ousted intelligence services of the former regime took the opportunity
to escalate the violence, tarnish Hemedti’s reputation and divide him
from the generals in the Transitional Military Council.
Whatever the true story, Hemedti is a specialist in violence and should
have seen it coming; he can’t complain if his own methods are used
against him.
On 29 June, the TMC accepted to negotiate on the basis of a power-
sharing formula proposed by the Ethiopian mediation. But the same day,
the RSF broke up a press conference by the AFC, and the following day
—30 June, the African Union deadline for a handover of power to a
civilian authority—broke up the democracy forces “millions march” with
tear gas and live bullets, killing seven.
But there’s also a twist to the story. Every ruler in Sudan, with one
notable exception, has hailed from the “Awlad al Balad”—the heartlands
of Khartoum and the neighboring towns on the Nile. The exception is
deputy and successor to the Mahdi, the Khalifa Abdullahi “al-Ta’aishi”
who was a Darfurian Arab, whose armies provided the majority of the
force that conquered Khartoum in 1885. The riverian elites remember
the Khalifa’s rule (1885-98) as a tyranny. They are terri ed it may return.
Hemedti is the face of that nightmare, the  rst non-establishment ruler
in Sudan for 120 years.
The other side of this coin is that Hemedti has opened negotiations with
the armed rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, and he may have
the clout and the credibility to cut a deal with them. Despite the
grievances against Hemedti’s paramilitaries, the Darfur rebels still
recognise that he is a Darfurian, and they have something in common
with this outsider to the Sudanese establishment.
When the Sudanese regime sowed the wind of the Janjaweed in Darfur
in 2003, they did not expect to reap the whirlwind in their own capital
city. In fact the seeds had been sown much earlier, when previous
governments adopted the war strategy in southern Sudan and southern
Kordofan of setting local people against one another, rather than
sending units of the regular army—manned by the sons of the riverain
establishment—into peril. Hemedti is that whirlwind. Immediately, he is
the boomerang of Janjaweedism that has returned to strike Khartoum.
But his ascendancy is also, indirectly, the revenge of the historically
marginalised. The slogan “we are all Darfur” must be more than an
expression of solidarity with the victims of the Janjaweed, but also a
far-reaching restructuring of Sudan to address the causes of the
recurrent wars in the peripheries.
The tragedy of the Sudanese marginalised is that the man who is
posing as their champion is the ruthless leader of a band of vagabonds,
who has been supremely skillful in playing the transnational military
marketplace.
“Hemedti” is employee of the month as the representative of that
inhuman logic of paramilitary mercenary politics.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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